The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
Throughout the last ten years, the Mexican city of Ciudad Juarez has experienced almost unprecedented levels of violence due to uncontrolled drug cartel activity. This once functioning city became the murder capital of the world and suffered negative economic, civil, and security ramifications. Mexican governmental efforts were unable to reduce the violence or improve the standard of living amongst Juarez residents.
However, during the last twelve months Juarez has seemingly recovered as a failed city, and exhibited an unforeseen rebound with improved metrics. Security professionals, local residents, and U.S. governmental officials are left to speculate the reasoning behind these improved conditions. Although security professionals have recently introduced the theory of failed cities within a functioning national government, all of this research has assessed characteristics associated with insurgent activity. However, the effects of insurgent activities do not necessarily correspond to cities suffering from criminal organizations such as drug cartels. This paper will consider a different set of diagnostic tools to assess a prospective failed city, such as Ciudad Juarez, based on the activities of a high intensity criminal organization, such as a Mexican drug cartel.
Ciudad Juarez: A Feral City Threat on our Doorstep?
The United States' geopolitical role within the international community has provided unique freedoms and opportunities unobtainable to most nations. Based on its unique geography, the U.S. has historically enjoyed greater domestic border security compared to other nations and has exploited this advantage to focus elsewhere.
However, contrary to the lack of publicity in mainstream media our neighbor to the south, Mexico, has been under siege from violent drug cartels whose prominence continues to grow domestically and internationally. The seemingly uninhibited growth of drug cartel power poses a serious risk to the United States due to our mutually beneficial relationship with Mexico. Mexico is our third largest trade partner, behind Based on the severity of these observations, security professionals question whether Juarez has become a completely failed city. An analytical assessment of a city progressing from relative normalcy into one which is void of basic governance, security, and stability was first introduced in a Dr. Once U.S. security professionals discard the categorization of drug cartels as insurgencies, they must accurately determine drug cartels objectives. A more accurate categorization of the Sinaloa Cartel is as a high-intensity criminal organization. Different than low-intensity crime, which is typically associated with short periods of specific criminal activity, high-intensity criminal acts are conducted by violent entrepreneurs who establish, "a set of organizational solutions and action strategies enabling organized force (or organized violence) to be converted into money or other valuable assets on a permanent basis…a means of increasing the private income of the wielders of force through ongoing relations of exchange with other groups that own other resources."1 7 F
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Albeit the term insurgency elicits an immediate image of the type of tactics used by drug cartels such as the Sinaloa Cartel and may be used by politicians to create an emotional response amongst constituents; it also causes the security professional trying to provide an appropriate solution to initially view the problem using the wrong lens.
Subsequently, the analytical tools used by law enforcement or security officials will fail to recognize the most effective means to resolve the issue due to misunderstood In an attempt to relate the conventional definition of feral towards the concept of a failed city, the previously mentioned Dr. Norton article, Feral Cities, proposed a set of analytical metrics to identify various levels of a city's progression towards failure.
Although Dr. Norton revised his article in 2010, he originally proposed a feral city as "a metropolis with a population of more than a million people in a state the government of which has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city's boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international system."1 9 F 20 His definition, and the forthcoming set of metrics, would sufficiently identify international feral cities with little, to none, security, economic growth, or civil support to its residents. Arguably, the advantage of this type of metropolitan area would be to promote a non-state actor seeking political upheaval and subsequent political gain. As previously mentioned, an organization like the Sinaloa Cartel does not seek such political dominance or the civil responsibility towards urban residents. Therefore, the utopian city for a major drug cartel to efficiently increase levels of revenue would not match Dr. Norton's aforementioned definition, and to the casual observer might appear more thriving than previously considered.
At the completion of Dr. Norton's 2010 revision of Feral Cities, he proposed 15 metrics based on three levels (green, yellow, and red) and five categories (Governance, Economy, Services, Security, and Civil Society). Dr. Norton suggested an assessment of this table would create a mosaic in which a city's health could be identified.
Additionally, he noted that a preponderance of green or red would not necessarily determine the ferality of a city, and the assessment is "a diagnostic tool…(which) merely produces a 'snapshot' and is therefore of limited utility unless supported by trend analysis."2 0 F 21 Dr. Norton's description of a city going feral almost elicits an apocalyptic vision in which "city's occupants have no access to even the most basic health or security assistance…human security is for the most part a matter of individual initiative…(cities) create enough pollution to qualify as an international environmental disaster zone."2 1 F 22 Although this assessment might be applicable to cities such as
Mogadishu during the height of its violence and lack of political control, this type of city would be the exact opposite of the type of environment a narco organization such as the Sinaloa Cartel would need to ensure economic prosperity. With an objective of maximum profit and uninterrupted illicit business activity, El Chapo would seek a thriving city which hides his organizational methods and produces minimal publicity.
Citing Dr. Norton's pioneering publication regarding the proposed assessment of feral cities, Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan attempted to further assess the subsequent status of a city which went beyond feral. Their theory examined a greater security risk if, or when, a city rebuilt itself beyond a feral status and became functional but only to sustain criminal activity. They created two additional levels, purple and black, respectively described as "fully feral" and "criminal city". 11 The origin of these two new levels were based on Sullivan and Bunker's theory of third phase cartels and third generation gangs. Narrowing the scope of the Ciudad Juarez challenge for the purpose of this paper, they describe third phase cartels which "rule parallel polities or criminal enclaves, acting much like warlords."2 2 F 23 Dr. Bunker and Mr. Sullivan also propose that these third phase cartels "pose a significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its Table 1 would be internationally accepted as an accurate set of conditions in an optimally functioning city. One could argue this assessment is biased towards western, democratic goals of governance and society, but for the purposes of this paper this type of nation-state will be assumed. The yellow level is also closely aligned with a city approaching ferality due to drug cartel influence, however Juarez experienced some additional conditions possibly indicative of common effects inherent with high-intensity crime. In addition to the economic conditions listed in This paper departs slightly from Dr. Bunker and Mr. Sullivan's description (Table   2 ) of fully feral (purple) and beyond feral (black) by offering a different perspective (Table 3) . They describe a fully feral city as one in which there is no government control and lacks basic necessities of security, services, and economy. Prior to establishing their own style of government, an effective insurgency will attempt to expose the existing government's inability to provide for the basic needs and security of its people.
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If done successfully this exposure will expand beyond local residents and include regional and international entities capable of favorably influencing change.
Contrastingly, the regional and international attention garnered by such lawlessness would be counterproductive to the Sinaloa Cartel's goals. This negative attention would likely precipitate an international reaction with subsequent employment of international security forces to regain the fully feral city. This may lead to a new and effective government, provided through an international and regional effort, with the manpower, money, and security resources to counter a drug cartel's influence. Using the Sinaloa Cartel example in Juarez, there are two primary objectives. The first is to win, through whatever means necessary, the turf war over Juarez and gain access to one of the most lucrative drug routes in the world. The second objective is to gain complete autonomy within Juarez through a complicit government willing to co-exist with a mutually exclusive organization while governing an economically and culturally thriving city. As regional and international communities await the answer from Ciudad Juarez and Mexico, the U.S. must prepare itself to address the feral city on our immediate border. The U.S. government can decide to increase its border protection to unprecedented levels to obtain a perception of control. However the risk may not be reduced but simply adjusted by the narco-criminal professionals resolute in their desire to maintain huge profit margins based on illicit drug trafficking. The ultimate source of the problem is very simple: the U.S. is the largest consumer of illegal drugs in the world and we share our border with a nation whose population lives in relative poverty, earning a minimum wage of $1.00(USD). 19 The disparity of economies and quality of life is the basis of the infamous Mexico Curse coined by their president Porfirio Diaz educational standards, high unemployment in young adults and low minimum wage for those able to find a job, the ability to gain quick wealth often outweighs the inherent risk.
The United States is trapped looking outward for an answer to Mexico's drug cartel problem in hopes that border cities like Ciudad Juarez will not become a feral city and infect a U.S. city like El Paso with heightened criminal activity. However, the lure of personal wealth gained from an illicit $65 billion dollar enterprise cannot be reduced by any amount of security until demand is reduced.
The further advancement of feral city assessments will enable security professionals to prevent the spread of associated violence, economic decline, and civil 
